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I. INTRODUCTION
The imposition of a maximum resale price by a manufacturer on
her distributors has long received harsh judicial treatment.1 At the
same time, for many years, a majority of economists have viewed max-
imum vertical price fixing as a practice that is not only benign, but,
indeed, one that results in an increase in consumer welfare, a primary
goal of antitrust.2 Further, maximum resale price restraints have been
seen by some as not only leading to an enhancement of consumer
welfare, but also as promoting every other suggested goal of antitrust
policy.3 Consequently, the Supreme Court's declaration of the per se
illegality of these restraints in Albrecht v. Herald Co. was met by a
chorus of criticism from economists and legal scholars alike.4 But,
even as many in the judiciary came to recognize the benefits of maxi-
mum vertical price fixing, its per se illegality stubbornly persisted
because of the Court's reluctance to violate the precedent of previous
decisions.
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1. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
2. See Roger Blair & James Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing and the Goals of Antitrust, 37
SYRACUSE L. REV, 43, 67-77 (1986).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 734e (1978);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 422 (1994); STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRIN-
CIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 255 (1993); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MAR-
KET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 558 (3d ed. 1990); Roger D. Blair & David
L. Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Consumer Welfare: An Economic Analysis, 33 U. FLA. L.
REV. 461 (1981); Frank Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981);
John E. Lopatka, Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust Law: A Snug Fit, 40 ANTITRUST BULL.
1 (1995); James N. Rosse, Vertical Price Fixing in Newspaper Distribution: A Per Se Rule That
Makes Everyone Worse Off (May 1980) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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The conflict between the benefits of maximum vertical price fix-
ing and its harsh legal treatment was aggravated further in Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, where the Court introduced a require-
ment that a plaintiff in a private action show he has suffered an "anti-
trust injury" in order for his damages to be compensable.5 "Antitrust
injury" is defined as an injury that results from some anticompetitive
aspect of the offending conduct.' The Court's clear purpose was to
bring antitrust law into conformity with the goals of antitrust. The
Court admonished the appellate court's holding because it "divorces
antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust laws without a
clear statutory command to do so."' As a result, in the post-Brunswick
world, courts were left to address a practice that most agreed was
procompetitive (as we shall see, the anticompetitive effects detected by
some were not convincing), but a practice that was nonetheless illegal.
Worse, once courts determined the illegality of a defendant's
seemingly procompetitive behavior, they then had to somehow find
that the plaintiff was injured by some anticompetitive aspect of a
procompetitive practice.
Brunswick cast in stark relief the tension between maximum price
fixing's per se illegality under Albrecht on the one hand, and the goals
of antitrust on the other, setting in motion a judicial odyssey that
ended when, in State Oil v. Khan,8 the Supreme Court finally cor-
rected its error. The Court ruled that maximum vertical price fixing is
no longer per se illegal, but it stopped short of declaring the practice
per se legal.9 Rather, the Court held that maximum price fixing is
now subject to a rule of reason analysis.1"
This result is a great improvement, albeit one not completely
satisfying to all. Vertical maximum price fixing is a procompetitive
policy that almost always leads to an increase in consumer welfare.
The reversal of its per se illegality and the substitution of a rule of
reason analysis is a positive result for the competitive process and for
consumers.
The road from Albrecht to Khan was a long and confusing one.
This Article attempts to sort out some of this confusion by portraying
that long road as a successful example of the antitrust injury doctrine's
ability to bring substantive antitrust law into compliance with the
goals of antitrust. To this end, this Article first-shows how the exist-
5. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
6. See id. at 489.
7. Seeid. at 487.
8. State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
9. Id. at 22.
10. Id.
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ence of successive monopoly provides an incentive for maximum
vertical price fixing and how maximum vertical price fixing leads to an
increase in consumer welfare. Second, it examines manufacturer alter-
natives to vertical price restraints, finding them less attractive in terms
of social welfare. Third, this Article analyzes other competitive con-
cerns raised by the Albrecht Court, finding them largely baseless.
Next, it looks at how the prohibition of maximum vertical price fixing
frustrates every one of the suggested goals of antitrust. Finally, this
Article analyzes the antitrust injury doctrine and shows how its appli-
cation to maximum resale price fixing forced substantive antitrust law
into conformance with the goals of antitrust.
II. SUCCESSIVE MONOPOLY AND MAXIMUM
VERTICAL PRICE FIXING
Let us now turn to an analysis of how vertical integration can be
profitable in the presence of successive monopoly." Successive mono-
poly occurs when a monopoly producer of some product sells it to a
distributor who is the only reseller of the product to final consumers. 2
Once it is understood why successive monopolists might want to
integrate, it is easy to appreciate why maximum vertical price fixing
might be an attractive alternative.
13
A. A Single Monopolist
First, let's examine what happens when both the production and
the distribution of a product are controlled by a single monopolist.
Assume that a manufacturer has obtained a patent for a product for
which he is the sole producer. Because the monopolist owns a patent,
the monopoly is perfectly legal, and antitrust concerns can be
ignored. 4 Assume also that the manufacturer has chosen to be the
only distributor of the product.'"
11. A full understanding of successive monopoly dates to at least Joseph J. Spengler, Verti-
cal Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950). See also Fritz Machlup &
Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 EcO-
NOMICA 101 (1960).
12. This section draws on James Fesmire & Richard Romano, Maximum Versus Minimum
Vertical Price Fixing and Promotional Incentives: Economics, Law, and Policy, 13 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 275, 275-81 (1990).
13. Id. at 281.
14. Without the protection of the patent, the manufacturer might be subject to attack
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
15. Much of what follows in this section constitutes a graphical demonstration, or proof, of
why successive monopoly provides an incentive for vertical integration and why maximum price
fixing might be an attractive alternative. Those with an allergy to graphical analysis may read
around the graphs and get the gist of the argument.
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In Figure 1, D is the demand by consumers for the manufac-
turer's product and MR is the associated marginal revenue curve.'
6
Let MCR represent the marginal cost of retailing (distributing) the
product, and let MCP represent the marginal cost of production. For
simplicity, assume both MC, and MCR are constant and are therefore
equal to average costs.17 Profits are maximized for the monopolist by
producing and selling Q units, where marginal revenue (MR) equals
the marginal cost of production and retailing (MR = MCp + MCR)." 8
Therefore, the monopolist will charge the price P, resulting in maxi-
mum profits equal to (P, - MC)Q. 9 No other combination of price
and quantity can result in greater profits for the firm with these
demand and cost curves.
16. See MICHAEL PARKIN, ECONOMICS 266-77 (4th ed. 1998). Marginal revenue is the
addition to total revenue that results from the sale of an additional unit of a product. See id. at
266. To sell more, a monopolist must lower price, implying that marginal revenue is less than
that price. See id. This is because the additional revenue that is received when one more unit is
sold at the new price is offset to some degree by the loss of revenue brought about by selling pre-
vious units for a price that is less than what they formerly commanded. In our examples, we use
linear demand curves for ease of exposition. For linear demand curves, marginal revenue is also
linear and falls twice as fast as the demand curve, bisecting the horizontal distance between the
price axis and the demand curve.
17. See id. at 220-21. We assume marginal cost is constant for ease of exposition. Mar-
ginal cost is the amount added to total cost when an additional unit is produced (or distributed).
See id. at 220. Average cost is the cost per unit of producing (or distributing) the product. See
id. If marginal cost is greater than average cost, then average cost will rise. See id. at 220-21. If
marginal cost is less than average cost, then average cost will fall. See id. If marginal cost is
equal to average cost, then the average cost remains unchanged. Our results do not depend on
the assumption of constant marginal costs. See id.
18. Marginal revenue is the amount added to total revenue by the sale of an additional unit.
Marginal cost is the addition to cost from the production and distribution of an additional unit.
As long as marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost, total revenue increases faster than total cost
and the firm's profits rise. As soon as marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue, total cost begins
to rise faster than total revenue and the firm's profits begin to fall.
19. The price of a product represents the revenue received from each unit sold. Marginal
cost (equal here to average cost) represents the cost per unit sold. The difference between the
firm's revenue per unit sold (P,) and cost per unit produced (MC) equals the profit per unit sold.
If Q units are sold, then total profit is equal to (P, - MC)Q.





MC = C +MCR
QuantityQI Q2
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Because the monopolist has the ability to choose the price and
resulting quantity of his good rather than being forced to accept some
price dictated by competitive forces, there is a resulting social welfare
loss. We can see this by contrasting our monopoly results with those
that would occur in a competitive industry. Suppose that we do have a
competitive industry, populated by many small firms, each of which
is subject to exactly the same production and distribution costs as our
monopolist.2" Competition among the many small firms in such an
environment would drive price to P2, where price is equal to average
and marginal cost MC.2 Because price is equal to average cost, firms
in this industry will earn a competitive rate of return.22 In a competi-
tive industry, then, the result would be a price P2, and Q units of
production and consumption. With a monopolist, who faces no com-
petition from rivals, we have seen the result would be a price P1, and a
restriction of output to Q.
In Figure 1, area ABC represents the loss in social welfare result-
ing from the monopolist's ability to restrict output. This loss is equal
to the area between the demand curve, which measures what con-
sumers would have been willing to pay, and the marginal cost curve,
which measures the cost of the resources for the lost output (Q - Q)."7
While our concern here is with social welfare, others would argue that
this loss in social welfare understates the degree of antitrust concern.
24
20. This may not be the case. Often, larger firms experience economies of scale, which are
reductions in average costs brought about by efficiencies associated with large-scale production.
While economies of scale are an important consideration in other antitrust contexts, they are not
relevant here because we consider smaller, competitive firms only to help illustrate what is meant
by social welfare.
21. Price is equal to average cost because the existence of many rivals restricts the ability of
competitive firms to raise prices. If one firm raises its price, its customers will seek out other
firms, and the price-increasing firm will lose profits.
22. A competitive rate of return means that firms are earning zero economic profit.
Because economists are interested in resource allocation, they include in total costs all payments
required to attract and hold resources. A competitive return, including payment for his time and
other resources invested in the firm, is required to keep the entrepreneur, an important resource,
in the business.
23. Society becomes better off every time it produces a unit of a good that adds more in
terms of benefits, measured by the price a consumer is willing to pay, than it adds in terms of
cost, which measures the value of the resources required to produce the good. This is so because
everyone involved can then be made better off. Conversely, if the production of goods yielding
net benefits is eliminated, society's welfare is reduced by the amount of the net foregone benefits.
24. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). Lande argues that
the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent unjust transfers of wealth from consumers




Now that we have examined the differences in output and
welfare results in the polar cases of monopoly and competitive mar-
kets, we next turn to the case where a monopoly producer, rather than
performing both the production (upstream) and the distribution
(downstream) functions, grants exclusive (monopoly) territories to a
system of independent distributors to whom he sells a product. This
is a case of successive monopoly. As described above, the objection to
monopoly arises from the loss of social welfare that results from the
monopolist's restriction of output.2" In successive monopoly, both the
upstream and the downstream monopolists have an incentive to
restrict output in order to bring about a higher price and greater
profits, thereby compounding the problem. These successive output
restrictions, one upon the other, bring about an even higher price and
lower output than that which results when a single monopolist con-
trols both the production and the retailing stages.
A monopolist who controls both production and distribution
faces a straightforward problem. He chooses that price that leads con-
sumers to buy the profit-maximizing quantity, the quantity at which
marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal. In a successive mono-
poly, however, there are two decision variables. The retailer chooses
the final price for consumers and the producer chooses the price that
the retailer must pay for each unit of the product, called the "transfer
price," T. It is the producer's task to choose the transfer price that
will lead the retailer, in turn, to charge a final price that will generate
maximum producer profits. Then, faced with the transfer price sel-
ected by the producer, the retailer chooses the final price that will
maximize his profits.
In Figure 2, assume that D, MR, MCR, and MC, are equivalent
to those in Figure 1. Because the producer knows that the retailer will
charge a final price to consumers that will maximize retailer profits,
the producer's challenge is to choose the unique value of T that will
induce the retailer to choose the price and the associated value of Q
that will maximize the producer's profits. In order to do this, the
producer must determine the retailer's demand for his product. In
other words, the producer must determine the relationship between
the transfer price that he charges the retailer and the quantity that the
retailer will purchase.
25. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
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The retailer's marginal cost of supplying an additional unit of the
product is equal to T + MCR, the sum of what he must pay the pro-
ducer and the marginal cost of retailing. The retailer must choose the
quantity that equates his marginal revenue and marginal cost in order
to maximize his profits.26 That is, the retailer must elect that quantity
where MR = T + MCR. Rearranging the equation, the result is that
the retailer will always choose that quantity where T = MR - MCR.
Therefore, the producer knows that each time he chooses some trans-
fer price, the resulting quantity sold will be determined where T is
equal to MR - MCR. The value of T, on the vertical axis, is related to
the quantity purchased by the retailer, on the horizontal axis, by MR -
MCR. Thus, the demand curve by the retailer for the product sold by
the producer is MR - MCR in Figure 2.
Because MR - MCR is the demand curve for the producer's prod-
uct, it must have an associated marginal revenue curve indicated by mr
in Figure 2.27 The producer then maximizes his profits by equating
his marginal revenue, mr, to his marginal cost, MCP, selling the quan-
tity Q. This requires the producer to charge T,, the transfer price
determined by his demand curve. Because the retailer must pay the
transfer price T, his marginal cost becomes T, + MCR. The retailer
equates his marginal revenue and marginal cost, MR = T, + MCR, at
Q units. The price that the retailer must charge his customers in
order to sell Q units is P3.
We can now compare the economic results when there is a single
monopolist in production and distribution with the results in a succes-
sive monopoly situation. The single monopolist maximizes his profits
by equating his marginal revenue, MR, with his marginal cost, MCp +
MCR, leading him to produce Q units and charge consumers P,. In
the successive monopoly situation, both the upstream and the down-
stream monopolists have an incentive to restrict output, resulting in a
lower quantity for consumers, Q, and a higher price, P3.
Recall now that earlier we found that the welfare loss due to the
output restriction of a single monopolist was equal to the area ABC.
That is, the welfare loss was equal to the difference between the
demand curve and the marginal cost curve (MC, + MCR) for the lost
output, Q - Q. By an analogous argument, we see that the social
welfare loss is greater with successive monopoly, equaling FEC, the
area between the demand curve and the marginal cost curve over the
greater lost output, Q - Q. A reorganization of the chain of distribu-
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
27. See PARKIN, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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tion, replacing a single monopolist with successive monopolists,
results in an additional welfare loss equal to the area FEBA.
Paradoxically, even though this reduction in welfare is brought
about by an intensified quest for monopoly profits by two monopolists
instead of just one, the replacement of a single monopolist with suc-
cessive monopolists results in decreased total profits. Recall that a
single monopoly led to profits equal to the area (P, - P2)Q.28 Under
successive monopoly, when a producer sells Q units to a retailer at a
price of T, and the cost per unit to the producer is MC, he makes
profits equal to ( 1 - MCp)Q. The retailer then sells Q units at a
price of P, and his cost per unit is T, + MCR. Therefore, the retailer's
profits are equal to (P3 - T, - MCR)Q,. The sum of producer profits
and retailer profits equals (P, - MCR - MCP)Q, or, simplified, (P -
P2)Q. An inspection of Figure 2 reveals that the sum of the profits
made by the producer and the retailer under successive monopoly is
less than the profits made by a single monopolist.
C. Maximum Price Fixing
Because the restriction of output by a downstream firm leads to
reduced upstream profits, a producer might decide to take steps to
curtail that restriction. One way to accomplish this would be through
the imposition of a maximum price on the retailer. This would mean
that the producer would take charge of both decision variables, P and
T. In Figure 2, the producer could require that the retailer, as a con-
dition of receiving his exclusive territory, charge a price no higher than
P, the same price that would maximize the producer's profits if he
were a single monopolist. At this price, consumers would purchase Q
units and the upstream firm would make profits equal to ( 1 -
MCP)Q, just equal to the profits the producer would make as a single
monopolist. 29 Because the highest price the retailer could charge con-
sumers, P, is exactly equal to his cost per unit, T1 + MCR, the retailer
would adopt the ceiling price and make zero economic profits.3"
In this successive monopoly situation, the upstream firm's impo-
sition of a maximum price on the downstream firm results in a price
reduction from P3 to P, and an increase in quantity from Q to Q.
This, in turn, leads to an increase in social welfare equal to the area
FEBA. Until Khan, however, maximum vertical price restraints were
per se illegal. 1 If maximum vertical price fixing is illegal, what
28. See supra note 19.
29. Id.
30. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 1-8.
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options does a manufacturer have to thwart the monopoly pricing of a
distributor, a practice that harms both the manufacturer and con-
sumers?
III. ALTERNATIVES TO MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING
If viable alternatives to maximum price fixing exist, we would
expect them to be utilized by manufacturers.32 Indeed, in Khan, the
Supreme Court observed that such alternatives had been employed,
noting that "manufacturers and suppliers appear to have fashioned
schemes to get around the per se rule against vertical maximum price
fixing."33 Alternative practices that lead to roughly equivalent econ-
omic outcomes without threat of antitrust liability are attractive to
suppliers.34 When suppliers are forced to forego a preferred practice
and substitute one that is less attractive, however, society suffers addi-
tional costs. The reason for this is that the foregone practice is
preferred either because it is more effective or because it is less costly.
These additional costs reflect an unnecessary waste of resources for
which society could find better uses. An examination of some alterna-
tives to maximum price fixing will demonstrate these additional social
costs.
A. Vertical Integration
Our analysis of successive monopoly noted that a manufacturer
could increase profits and make consumers better off by integrating
vertically. If firms are denied the ability to fix maximum prices
legally, some will choose the integration option.3" In fact, maximum
vertical price fixing is a contractual alternative to vertical integration.
A firm's choice to integrate vertically as an alternative to maximum
price fixing does not imply that the result is economically equivalent
for society. The manufacturer may not be an efficient distributor.
The cost to the manufacturer in lost profits due to successive mono-
poly may lead him to vertically integrate even if the costs of distribu-
tion increase as a result. If the lost profits associated with successive
monopoly are greater than the lost profits resulting from the higher
costs of distribution associated with vertical integration, the manufac-
turer will choose vertical integration, even if it is more costly to
32. This section draws on Roger Blair & John Lopatka, Albrecht Overruled-At Last, 66
ANTITRUST L.J. 537, 554-58 (1998).
33. Khan, 522 U.S. at 19.
34. Various alternatives are examined in depth in Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquibel,
Maximum Price Restraints in Franchising, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 157 (1996).
35. See Blair & Fesmire, supra note 2, at 59-67.
20011
Seattle University Law Review
society. Further, if firms choose to integrate vertically, independent
distributors will disappear, frustrating the Albrecht Court's concern for
the "freedom of traders," traders that will no longer exist.
B. Dual Distribution
If a producer is not happy with the price charged by one or more
of her distributors, she can engage in dual distribution.36 To do so, the
producer simply begins to distribute her product in the offending,
formerly exclusive, territory. By directly competing with the distrib-
utor and by charging the desired price, the producer prevents the
distributor from charging a higher price. This approach to the prob-
lem necessarily results in inefficiencies.
Successive monopoly exists because the producer has granted the
distributor an exclusive territory. Everything else equal, the producer
would prefer that the distribution function be organized competitively.
The competing distributors would force the price down to a level that
would provide them with a competitive return, thereby maximizing
the producer's profits.37 The producer would not establish exclusive
territories and create a successive monopoly situation for herself if
distribution could be efficiently organized in a competitive market. In
order for the producer to prefer exclusive territories for its distrib-
utors, there must be elements of natural monopoly-economies of
scale-that render monopoly distributorships more efficient.38  By
engaging in dual distribution, the producer increases the number of
distributors in an area and thereby increases the average cost of distri-
bution, causing reduced profits. If the losses due to unexploited
economies of scale are less than the profits lost due to successive
monopoly pricing, the producer will engage in dual distribution. But,
as is the case with vertical integration, if the producer's first choice is
maximum price fixing, the resort to inefficient dual distribution comes
at a cost to society in the form of wasted resources.
A producer may merely threaten to engage in dual distribution.
In Jack Walters, for example, the producer stood ready to supply cus-
tomers directly at its advertised prices.39 This, of course, made it very
difficult for the distributor to raise its price above that level. If a
producer never actually has to sell directly, it will incur no added costs
due to unexploited economies of scale. To make the threat credible,
36. See id. at 110-11.
37. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 344 (1985).
38. A natural monopoly exists when the average cost of production diminishes as the vol-
ume of production increases over the relevant range.
39. Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
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however, the producer must actually be capable of dual distribution;
establishing this capability may not be costless.
C. Performance Standards
There is an inverse relationship between the price a distributor
charges for a product and the quantity of that product sold to consum-
ers.4" This means that if the distributor raises her price above the
price desired by the producer, the quantity sold will decrease, lowering
producer profits and providing an incentive for maximum vertical
price fixing.4 An alternative to specifying a maximum price, however,
is to instead specify a minimum quantity. If the producer selects the
quantity that corresponds to the desired price, the only way that the
distributor can meet this performance standard is to charge the opti-
mal price. The distribution of gasoline provides a good example of
sales quotas. In the typical gasoline franchise contract, a minimum
volume of gasoline is specified.42 This type of performance standard
might seem to be a relatively low-cost alternative to price restraints,
but this may not be true.
In order for a sales quota to be credible, a manufacturer must be
willing to enforce it by terminating relationships with dealers who do
not meet the quota's requirements. Such terminations are not without
costs, however. Terminating relations with offending dealers can give
a manufacturer a bad reputation, making it difficult to find good
dealers. If a manufacturer must select from a reduced pool of dealers,
the result might well be less efficient dealers and an accompanying in-
crease in costs. Further, in some industries-notably automobile and
gasoline distribution-there are statutory protections for distributors.
Such legal constraints on a producer's ability to terminate an offending
distributor undermine the effectiveness of a sales quota. If termina-
tions lead to litigation, the costs to society of enforcing performance
standards may be substantial.
D. Price Announcements
A producer may choose to announce suggested retail prices.
This information can be included in advertising or printed on a prod-
uct's package. If customers of dealers charging higher prices become
aware of the suggested prices, they may conclude that they can obtain
a better price elsewhere. Customers may refuse to pay the higher price
40. Supranotes 11-13.
41. Supranotes 19-24.
42. See Andrea Shephard, Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gas-
oline Retailing, 24 RAND J. ECON. 58, 62 (1993).
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and threaten to shop around. This, of course, would put great pres-
sure on dealers to conform to the suggested price. One prominent
example of this practice is the automobile industry, where manufac-
turers put price information on all new cars.
Price announcements are not always intended to enforce maxi-
mum prices. Their purpose may very well be to serve an informa-
tional function apart from maximum resale pricing. In a successive
monopoly setting, however, price announcements may make it very
difficult for dealers to raise prices above those suggested by the
manufacturer. Once again, there are policing and monitoring costs
involved with price announcements that can make this alternative
more expensive for society.
E. Consignment
If the relationship between a supplier and a dealer is structured
as one of consignment, the per se rule against maximum vertical price
fixing can be avoided.43 In a consignment relationship, there is no
sales transaction between a dealer and a supplier. Rather, the dealer
is, in fact, the agent of the supplier, who is the principle in the rela-
tionship. For example, in Ryoko Manufacturing Co. v. Eden Services, a
supplier was able to limit the prices charged by dealers by establishing
an agency relationship with the dealers."
Consignment will not succeed as an instrument of resale price
maintenance, however, if the "agent" is in fact economically indistin-
guishable from a purchaser. In Union Oil Co., the Supreme Court
found that a gasoline retailer obtaining gasoline under a consignment
agreement was economically indistinguishable from a purchaser and
that the retailer's ability to refuse to deal did not immunize the
supplier from prosecution for an illegal "minimum" price maintenance
agreement.45 Similarly, in Greene v. General Foods Corp., when a sup-
plier attempted to circumvent Albrecht's proscription of "maximum"
prices by calling his distributors agents, the court held that the dealers
were actually purchasers.46 But, if, in order to escape per se illegality,
a supplier were to actually change the economic function of its dealers,
the altered relationship would not be the preferred solution and the
costs to society would increase.
43. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 482 (1926).
44. Ryoko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1223-24 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1026 (1988).
45. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).




Each of the alternatives we have discussed is less desirable than
maximum vertical price fixing for both the supplier and for society.
The per se illegality of maximum vertical price restraints, therefore,
forces the manufacturer and society into situations that are second
best, thereby reducing social welfare.
IV. OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE CONCERNS
Our analysis has shown not only that maximum resale price
maintenance leads to an increase in consumer welfare, but also that if
manufacturers prefer maximum price fixing, the alternatives they
might be forced to choose from are undesirable because they impose
higher costs on society. However, the Albrecht Court had a variety of
other competitive concerns that might detract from our conclusion
that maximum vertical price fixing is good for society.47 In its deci-
sion, the Court condemned maximum price fixing because "by substi-
tuting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the
competitive market, [these schemes] may severely intrude upon the
ability of buyers to compete and survive in the market."48 Without
specifying what competitive market forces it thought were in operation
in Albrecht's exclusive territory, the Court went on to explain:
Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to furnish
services essential to the value which goods have for the consum-
er or to furnish services and conveniences which consumers
desire and for which they are willing to pay. Maximum price
fixing may channel distribution through a few large or speci-
fically advantaged dealers who otherwise would be subject to
significant nonprice competition. Moreover, if the actual price
charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always the
fixed maximum price.., the scheme tends to acquire all the
attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices. 
49
First, what of the validity of the Albrecht Court's claim that max-
imum vertical price fixing impairs a dealer's freedom by limiting her
ability to set prices? It is true, of course, that the dealer is not free to
raise prices above the imposed cap. It is also true that she is free to
choose not to be a dealer. If maximum price fixing is illegal, then nei-
ther the dealer nor the manufacturer is free to negotiate a mutually
beneficial deal. For example, the dealer freely gives up her right to set
the retail price in exchange for the grant of an exclusive territory. But
it is not at all obvious that preserving the right of a dealer to set price,
47. This section follows in part Blair & Lopatka, supra note 32.
48. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152.
49. Id. at 152-53.
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while at the same time denying the dealer and the manufacturer the
right to negotiate a beneficial deal, constitutes a net increase in free-
dom. Further, if the prohibition of maximum price fixing results in
vertical integration and the elimination of independent dealers, it can
hardly be argued that dealer freedom has been enhanced.
Second, do suppliers have an incentive to set a price ceiling so
low that dealers are unable to provide the services that consumers
want? The attack on this argument usually begins by conceding that
the price cap might indeed be so low that some dealers may be unable
to offer services that are desired by consumers. However, the supplier
seeks to set the price so that consumers in the aggregate will benefit
from the provision of such services. If the supplier makes a mistake in
selecting the price ceiling, he will suffer lost profits. This argument
implicitly assumes that the interests of the supplier and those of con-
sumers are exactly aligned. Why would a supplier set the dealer's
price so low that consumers would not be provided the services they
desire?50
Third, why would suppliers want to channel distribution
through large dealers? Suppliers certainly would have no incentive to
do so if large dealers were less efficient than small dealers. If large
dealers were more efficient, then channeling sales through them would
increase efficiency and consumer welfare.
The final concern of the Albrecht Court was that a maximum
resale price restraint would disguise an arrangement fixing minimum
prices,5' a concern that sounds more substantial than the others. Like
most of the other concerns, however, it does not survive close scrutiny.
Suppliers impose maximum resale price restraints on the retailers of a
product because they want to charge a price that is above the level that
maximizes the profits of the supplier. This forces the retailers to
charge a price below the price they desire. Since each retailer wants to
charge a higher price than the one specified by the supplier, none will
charge a lower price. Thus, all retailers charge the same price. But
this uniform price is below the prices that would otherwise prevail.
Consequently, consumer welfare increases.
Suppose, instead, that there is a horizontal conspiracy to set a
minimum price.52 The retailers agree among themselves not to com-
50. See Fesmire & Romano, supra note 12 (arguing that under certain conditions maximum
vertical price fixing can lead to a decrease in services along with a decrease in welfare). See also
Roger Blair et al., Applying the Rule of Reason to Maximum Resale Price Fixing: Albrecht Over-
ruled, in 9 ADVANCES IN APPLIED MICROECONOMICS: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 215-30
(Michael R. Baye ed., 2000).
51. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153.
52. No persuasive economic theory supports per se condemnation of minimum vertical
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pete on price and, in fact, agree to raise the price above the level that
would otherwise prevail. If there is no cheating on the agreement by
retailers, prices of all retailers will be uniform. In this instance, how-
ever, the uniform price will be above the price that would otherwise
prevail. As a result, consumer welfare will decline and society will
suffer.
Uniform prices by retailers, then, can be the result of either a
maximum resale price restraint, which increases consumer welfare, or
a horizontal minimum price conspiracy, which reduces consumer wel-
fare. While price uniformity by itself does not distinguish the two
cases, other relatively simple tests can be used to identify these
restraints. First, if one of the retailers complains because she wants to
charge higher prices, it seems obvious that a beneficial maximum
resale price restraint is in place. Further, since members of a mini-
mum price conspiracy benefit from such an arrangement, one would
not expect them to complain. A member would not want to expose
his participation in an illegal arrangement. Moreover, even a compet-
ing dealer would not likely challenge a disguised cartel, for she would
benefit from the higher price, perhaps even more than the members.
Therefore, if a retailer or a retailer's competitor complains, at least if
the competitor is not asserting predatory pricing, the assumption
should be that the restraint is beneficial to consumers.
While price uniformity alone may not be convincing, there is
other evidence that is more compelling. For example, one can com-
pare prices and quantities before and after the restraint is imposed. If
a beneficial maximum price restraint is the cause of the uniform pric-
ing, then prices will fall as a result of the restraint. In addition,
quantity demanded will increase as consumers respond to the lower
price. In contrast, if the uniform prices are a result of a minimum
price fixing agreement, then price will increase and quantity
demanded will decrease after the agreement is reached. Thus, the
intertemporal patterns of both price and quantity sold provide useful
evidence to distinguish between good and bad restraints.
The anticompetitive consequences of maximum vertical price
fixing posited by the Albrecht Court do not support its per se illegality.
Most of the consequences are either not anticompetitive or are simply
implausible. It is possible for minimum resale price fixing to be
disguised as maximum vertical price fixing, but, if that is the case, it
can be unveiled for what it is with the tests mentioned above. In sum,
it must be concluded here that there is no convincing theory of
price fixing that is purely vertical.
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anticompetitive harm that justifies per se condemnation of maximum
vertical price fixing.
V. MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING AND THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST
The antitrust laws serve to promote competition and, at the same
time, to discourage monopoly and monopolizing behavior. 3 Econom-
ic theory tells us that this will lead to increased welfare for consumers
because monopolies tend to restrict output and raise prices for con-
sumers. Due to this direct connection between discouraging mono-
poly and monopolistic behavior and increasing efficiency-that is,
enhancing consumer welfare-the prevailing view today is that the
antitrust laws were intended, or should be interpreted, to promote
economic efficiency. 4 Some scholars, however, argue that efficiency is
just one of a broad range of political and social goals that the laws are
intended to promote.5" Among these other goals are such admirable
purposes as the dispersion of economic and political power, the pro-
motion of small business and small business opportunities, the local
control over business, the prevention of industrial concentration, and
the creation and preservation of entrepreneurial ability. 6 In addition
to serving these several goals, the antitrust laws have distributive
implications as well. Indeed, Robert Lande has argued that the
primary purpose of the antitrust laws is distributive: to prevent the
unjust transfer of wealth from consumers to producers.5 7
One should not be surprised that these different views exist.
Competitive markets are widely thought to promote efficiency and to
protect consumers from the greed of monopoly producers.5 8 At the
same time, the conditions necessary for the existence of competitive
markets conduce the other values most often offered as goals of
antitrust. That is, competitive markets require many small sellers,
each with limited economic power. Entry into or exit from competi-
53. See generally 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 4, at 103-13; ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-71 (rev. ed. 1993); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1976). The analysis in this section draws on Roger Blair &
James Fesmire, supra note 2.
54. See I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 4, at 103-05; BORK, supra note 53, at ix-xii;
POSNER, supra note 53, at 22.
55. See DONALD DEWEY, THE ANTITRUST EXPERIMENT IN AMERICA 1-51 (1990);
Harlan Blake & William Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM L. REV. 377, 382-84 (1965);
Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else
Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1209-13 (1977).
56. These various goals are often stated in other terms, but the ones mentioned capture the
meaning of most of those suggested.
57. See generally Lande, supra note 24.
58. See generally BORK, supra note 53.
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tive industries is easy. These conditions imply the diffusion of
economic power and the consequent diffusion of political power that
goes with it, the promotion of small business over big business, the
prevention of industrial concentration, and the creation and preserva-
tion of entrepreneurial ability. In other words, competitive markets
imply a world of small firms and independent businesspeople, bounti-
ful opportunities for new small businesses and, because they are small,
businesses that are local in character. The diffusion and localization of
economic power and interests imply the diffusion and localization of
political power and interests. Thus, do we seek competitive efficiency,
or do competitive markets connote a Jeffersonian world?
While it is often true that efficiency goals also imply competitive
markets, this is not always the case. Sometimes efficiency and con-
sumer welfare can be enhanced by the merger, growth, and concentra-
tion of economic power. When this occurs, the goals of economic
efficiency and consumer welfare are at odds with other social and
political goals associated with competitive markets. When this con-
flict exists, there must be guideposts to show the way. Robert Bork
summarized this need well:
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to
give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the
law-what are its goals? Everything else follows from the
answer we give. Is the antitrust judge to be guided by one value
or by several? If by several, how is he to decide cases where a
conflict in values arises? Only when the issue of goals has been
settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive
rules. s9
The intention here is not to advance one goal over any other.
Rather, the intention is to assess whether maximum vertical price
fixing is consistent with the most popular goals of antitrust that have
been advanced by others.
A. Maximization of Consumer Welfare
Few would deny that the promotion of economic efficiency (or
consumer welfare) is a major goal of antitrust policy. In fact, many
would contend that the maximization of consumer welfare through the
enhancement of economic efficiency is the primary, if not the exclu-
sive, goal of antitrust law. Robert Bork is the most famous spokesman
for this view.6" He contends that the legislature intended the antitrust
59. Id. at 50.
60. Bork's position is unequivocal: "[T]he only legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximi-
zation of consumer welfare." Id. at 51. In addition to his provocative book, see Robert H. Bork,
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laws to promote consumer welfare through allocative efficiency.61 His
argument is based on a thorough review of the structure of the anti-
trust laws and their legislative history.62
Bork first points to explicit statements by Senator Sherman, the
Senate Judiciary Committee, and by members of the House of Repre-
sentatives.63 Senator Sherman consistently displayed a concern about
anticompetitive behavior, which he believed prevented free competi-
tion and resulted in higher prices to consumers.64 He wished to
protect the competitive environment, a goal that is inconsistent with
objectives other than the pursuit of consumer welfare. If the primary
goal of antitrust law is to permit the competitive process to seek its
unfettered result, then the pursuit of other goals is not possible unless
they too are the natural result of the competitive process.65
The four Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee dis-
played their agreement with Sherman through speeches or through
their own antitrust bills. The Republicans either demonstrated no
disagreement or showed basic agreement with Senator Sherman. The
House of Representatives, through its antitrust bills, also seemed to
display a consumer interest, or at least a desire to further values not
inconsistent with consumer welfare.66
Second, congressional objections to cartels and mergers are con-
sistent with the consumer welfare theme. Since cartels result in higher
prices, opposition to cartels promotes consumer welfare. Congress
saw mergers as "loose-knit" conspiracies that sought the same result as
cartels, i.e., higher prices.67
Third, Congress' distinction between legal and illegal mergers
demonstrates that it was concerned with consumer welfare. Mergers
that resulted in increased efficiencies were viewed as being in the con-
sumer's interest and were not made illegal.6" Monopoly in itself was
not made illegal. Only firms that achieved their monopoly status
through practices that did not promote efficiency were considered
illegal.69
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Bork, Legislative Intent].
61. See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 60, at 11.
62. Id. at 11-30.
63. Id. at 13-16.
64. See id.
65. Seeid. at 16.
66. See id. at 17.
67. See id. at 21-26.
68. See id. at 29-30.
69. See id. at 30.
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If Bork is right and the goal of antitrust is to promote efficiency
and enhance consumer welfare, then our analysis of the economics of
maximum vertical price fixing demonstrates that maximum vertical
price fixing serves this purpose well. Such price restraints lead to
higher output and lower prices. By overruling Albrecht, Khan made
the use of maximum resale price restraints under conditions of succes-
sive monopoly much safer. This is unambiguously beneficial from the
perspective of consumer welfare.
B. Preventing Unjust Transfers of Wealth
Robert Lande has argued that the primary legislative intent of
the antitrust laws is distributive, preventing unjust transfers of wealth
from consumers to producers.7" He contends that Congress did not
intend to achieve some superior allocation of wealth in a redistributive
sense; Congress merely intended to prevent one type of transfer that it
considered inequitable.7" Trusts and monopolies were prevented
because they "unfairly extracted wealth" that would belong to con-
sumers under competitive conditions.72 Lande points out that Bork's
arguments are based on evidence that provides more direct support for
the wealth-transfer thesis than for Bork's welfare-maximization
theme.73 For example, the prevention of price increases resulting from
monopoly power directly supports the position that unjust transfers
should be prevented and only indirectly supports the consumer wel-
fare thesis. Lande also points out that in 1890, it would have been
highly unlikely that legislators would have had much appreciation for
70. See Lande, supra note 24. In addition, Elzinga notes that conventional wisdom holds
there is a tradeoff between equity and efficiency:
In light of this well-known tradeoff, it is notable that antitrust enforcement generally
served to help those at the low end of the income distribution range without decreas-
ing efficiency. Antitrust achieves this double benefit when it promotes efficiency in
resource allocation by preventing the cartelization or monopolization of a market
shopped in by low-income buyers. The reason is straightforward: prices will be made
lower in this market so that for any given income, however low, a larger basket of
goods and services can be purchased.
In sum, the pursuit of efficiency goals through antitrust enforcement is consistent
with the objective of equitable distribution of income.
Elzinga, supra note 55, at 1194-95.
In fact, in most cases economists will take the distribution of income as "given" or will "hold
income constant" when dealing with matters of efficiency. This does not deny the fact that some
distributions of income are more conducive to economic efficiency than others. Regrettably per-
haps, it is often true that the more equal distributions of income are those that provide incentives
that to some extent discourage economic efficiency.
71. See Lande, supra note 24, at 72-74.
72. See id. at 83.
73. See id.
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the concept of allocative efficiency, since economists could scarcely
have articulated that concept at that time. 4
The thrust of Lande's argument is that antitrust was intended to
prevent the conversion of consumer surplus into the producer profit
that is inherent in a monopolist's successful pursuit of profit. Maxi-
mum vertical price fixing is consistent with this goal of antitrust.
While recognizing in Figure 1 the social loss we have identified as area
ABC, Lande points out that because of monopoly, consumers pay P,
instead of P2 for the Q units they consume. The difference between
these prices represents a transfer of wealth to producers from con-
sumers because of monopoly power. The total transfer is equal to
(P, - P)Q. Those who advocate consumer welfare and efficiency as
the primary goal of antitrust acknowledge that this transfer exists.
But, they add that producers are consumers too, so the wealth transfer
is from one group of consumers to another, leaving total consumer
welfare unchanged. Hence, it is unclear whether this should be
assessed as a social lossS
The exercise of maximum vertical price restraints prevents dis-
tributors with market power from raising prices. Although the up-
stream firm has monopoly power, which it exercises, maximum resale
price restraints prevent the distributors from making matters worse by
raising prices even higher. Therefore, price restraints are perfectly
consistent with the goal of preventing unjust transfers of wealth from
producers to consumers.
C. Preventing Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power
Although it is hard to find anyone who believes that efficiency is
not one of the goals of antitrust, the idea that efficiency concerns (or
consumer welfare) override all other values grates on many critics.
Professor Fox's remarks are instructive:
As history teaches, "efficiency" is not the reason for anti-
trust .... Distrust of power is the one central and common
ground that over time has unified support for antitrust
statutes. ...
One over-arching idea has unified these three concerns (distrust
of power, concern for consumers, and commitment to oppor-
tunity for entrepreneurs): competition as process. The competi-
tion process is the preferred governor of markets. If the
74. See id. at 87-88.
75. The welfare criterion that we have adopted here is neutral with regard to wealth trans-
fers. See supra note 18.
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impersonal forces of competition, rather than public or private
power, determine market behavior and outcomes, power is by
definition dispersed, opportunities and incentives for firms with-
out market power are increased, and the results are acceptable
and fair .... In sum, the claim that efficiency has been the goal
and the fulcrum of antitrust is weak at best .... The reasons
offered do not withstand scrutiny.7
Professor Fox is not alone in her view that the purposes of anti-
trust law include the prevention of excessive concentrations of
economic power and the tendency of such concentrations to lead to
undesirable government intrusion into the economy. Robert Pitofsky,
for example, notes that Congress "exhibited a clear concern that an
economic order dominated by a few corporate giants could, during a
time of domestic stress or disorder, facilitate the overthrow of demo-
cratic institutions and the installation of a totalitarian regime."77 Judge
Learned Hand expressed similar sentiments in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America when he wrote that "great industrial consol-
idations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic
results .... [A]mong the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire
to put an end to great aggregations of capital because of the helpless-
ness of the individual before them."
78
Assuming that a central goal of antitrust is preventing the con-
centration of economic power, we must have some idea of what
constitutes economic power. Most economists define market power as
the ability to raise price profitably by restricting output. 79 To the
extent that a firm exercises its market power, the firm reduces
consumer welfare. Under conditions of successive monopoly, how-
ever, two firms have market power, the producer and the distributor.
Assuming that the producer's monopoly is legitimate and not subject
to antitrust challenge, the producer's use of maximum resale price
restraints limits the exercise of monopoly power by the distributor,
resulting in a lower price and a greater quantity for consumers. Fur-
ther, as we have seen above, if a producer is unable to impose
maximum prices on a distributor, one attractive alternative is to
integrate forward, taking over the distribution function and giving the
producer more control over society's resources. Maximum vertical
76. Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 1140, 1152-54 (1981).
77. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1054
(1979).
78. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
79. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 72-73 (1993).
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price fixing, then, seems to be consistent with the goal of limiting eco-
nomic power. Moreover, few would argue today that economic power
and political power are unrelated.
D. Protecting Individual Freedom
We have concluded above that the restraint on dealer freedom,
noted by the Albrecht Court as an adverse consequence of maximum
vertical price fixing, does not constitute an anticompetitive effect.
Because it has no anticompetitive effect, its practice cannot be deemed
inconsistent with the goal of maximizing consumer welfare.
It is possible that dealer freedom is an appropriate, independent
goal of antitrust policy. No doubt, Americans value individual free-
dom. Professors Harlan Blake and William Jones argue that "[i1n the
absence of strong countervailing considerations, we favor freedom of
action and the wide range of choices that freedom implies. °80 They
argue that the freedom of an individual to choose among competing
products is obviously reduced when market power, the control of a
market by one or a few sellers, replaces both the lack of power associ-
ated with competitive markets and a wide range of choices for con-
sumers. 8 Similarly, market power is associated with barriers to entry,
and barriers to entry reduce the opportunity for employees to become
entrepreneurs. Market power, then, reduces the freedom of both
consumers and business entities, whereas the purpose of the antitrust
laws [is] to "expand the range of consumer choice and entrepreneurial
opportunity by encouraging the formation of markets of numerous
buyers and sellers." 2
In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, the Supreme
Court found that agreements between suppliers to impose maximum
resale price restraints "cripple the freedom of traders and thereby
restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment, '"83
a theme that was echoed in Albrecht.4 This is not the only freedom
involved, however. Consider consumer freedom. Lower prices confer
more choices on the consumer than do higher prices. Assume that a
consumer is spending all of her income on a variety of goods and
services. If the price of one of these goods or services falls, the con-
sumer can purchase the same combination of goods and services, but
for a smaller expenditure. That is, this week she can buy everything
80. Blake & Jones, supra note 55, at 383.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 384.
83. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
84. See generally Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145.
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that she bought last week and have money left over. The consumer is
now free to use this remaining income to buy more of the same good at
the new, lower price, or to buy more of other goods. Clearly, her
options have been enhanced by the reduction in price. The setting of
maximum resale prices increases consumer choice and, therefore, is
consistent with promoting the freedom of consumers.
Still, maximum resale price restraints do reduce the retailer's
freedom to make business decisions. At the same time, though, the
restraints may preserve the very existence of these resellers. We have
already seen that conditions of successive monopoly provide an incen-
tive for vertical integration, which eliminates the distributor alto-
gether. In Missouri, for example, the Kansas City Star terminated all
of its independent distributors and hired salaried distributors."5 A
main motivation for this business strategy was the legal problem
associated with vertical pricing restrictions.86 A similar result occurred
in California. In Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, a publisher
found it could not control the resale prices of its distributors, and so it
terminated them.87 After roughly ten years of legal wrangling, the
strategy was deemed legal.88 No doubt the cost of getting to this out-
come was substantial.
As the theory predicts, a common response to the illegality of
maximum price fixing was vertical integration. The producer can
restore, through vertical integration, the profits lost as a result of
downstream monopolists exercising their market power by raising
price. Unfortunately, vertical integration results in the elimination of
independent distributors. It is hard to fathom why those interested in
promoting freedom for its own sake would prefer this outcome to one
where pricing freedom is somewhat restricted, but the independent
distributor continues to survive.
We have also noted above that the alternatives to both maximum
vertical price fixing and vertical integration are hardly conducive to
increasing dealer freedom. Performance standards, dual distribution,
price announcements, and consignment arrangements reduce freedom
of action by dealers just as surely as do maximum price restraints.
85. See Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1982), reh'g en banc,
727 F.2d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that in spite of the Star Co.'s policy of not recognizing
a carrier's proprietary right in its assigned route, some routes were sold to third parties for up to
$300,000).
86. For an excellent analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Integration by the News-
paper Monopolist, 69 IOWA L. REV. 451 (1983).
87. See Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1985).
88. See id. at 475, 477.
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Successive monopoly exists as a result of economic forces. Maxi-
mum vertical price fixing is a response to the existence of successive
monopoly that increases consumer welfare. In addition to increasing
consumer welfare, maximum vertical price fixing is consistent with all
of the other suggested goals of antitrust. Further, if a manufacturer
chooses vertical price restraints, then that practice constitutes the most
efficient alternative for society. And yet, under Albrecht, such
restraints were per se illegal.
VI. MAXIMUM VERTICAL PRICE FIXING AND THE
ANTITRUST INJURY DOCTRINE
The Albrecht rule against maximum vertical price fixing was at
cross-purposes with all of the suggested goals of antitrust. As previ-
ously mentioned, a chorus of criticism from economists and legal
scholars greeted the decision. Thus, the Brunswick Court and its
antitrust injury doctrine were faced with the challenge of bringing
antitrust law into conformity with the goals of antitrust.
89
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "[a]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor [sic] ... and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained."9 Private parties,
then, participate in the enforcement of the antitrust laws by bringing
suit for the recovery of damages resulting from antitrust violations."
While section 4 seems to suggest that a wide array of private parties
are eligible to sue for a variety of actual injuries," the courts have, in
fact, restricted both those who have standing to sue93 and the types of
injuries94 that are compensable.
89. This section follows in part Roger Blair & Gordon L. Lang, Albrecht After ARCO:
Maximum Resale Price Fixing Moves Toward the Rule of Reason, 44 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1007
(1991).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
91. PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION (L. White ed. 1988) provides an interesting empir-
ical view of private suits.
92. When a manufacturer fixes her price, the quantity sold is necessarily reduced. This
injures the suppliers of all of the firm's inputs: employees who are laid off because of reduced
production, firms that provide raw materials to the manufacturers, those that transport the fin-
ished product to consumers, etc. The ripple effect is substantial, but these injured parties cannot
sue for damages.
93. Antitrust standing identifies parties who may sue. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (3d Cir. 1968), and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (7th
Cir. 1977), require that direct injury be suffered by those who sue. See also Blue Shield of Vir-
ginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (4th Cir. 1982); Associated General Contractors, Inc. v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (9th Cir. 1983).
94. Antitrust injury refers to the types of injuries that the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. 477.
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In its Brunswick decision, the Supreme Court introduced the
antitrust injury doctrine.9" In the 1950s, Brunswick's sales of bowling
lanes and related equipment rose dramatically as a result of an in-
creased interest in bowling." A large portion of Brunswick's sales was
financed with credit the company extended to the bowling alley
operators.97 When the popularity of bowling diminished in the 1960s,
Brunswick's sales decreased, and some of the bowling centers
defaulted on their loans.9" Brunswick repossessed the equipment but
had little success in reselling or leasing it.9 9 Brunswick found itself in
great financial difficulty and, as a result, began to acquire and operate
the bowling centers in an effort to salvage what it could financially."'
Pueblo, a rival bowling center, filed suit, claiming that the
Brunswick acquisitions violated section 7 of the Clayton Act because
they were potentially anticompetitive.' Pueblo claimed that Bruns-
wick's size permitted it to reduce competition by driving smaller rivals
out of business." 2 The jury agreed, finding that even though there
was no evidence that Brunswick had actually driven rivals out of busi-
ness, it had the ability to do so, therefore, the acquisitions violated
section 7.1°3 Pueblo claimed damages equal to the additional profits it
would have earned had Brunswick allowed the financially troubled
bowling centers to fail.0 4 That is, if Brunswick had not made the
acquisitions, Pueblo would have faced less competition and made
higher profits.
The Supreme Court agreed that Pueblo's profits were lower
because of Brunswick's illegal acquisitions; there was no dispute over
whether there was an injury in fact.' But the Court ruled that Pueblo
had not suffered an injury that was compensable under the antitrust
laws. ' 6 The antitrust laws were intended to protect competition, not
competitors. Therefore, it would have been bizarre to compensate
Pueblo for the additional profits it would have earned if competition
had been reduced. The Court explained:
95. See Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down
the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273 (1998) for a review
and critical analysis of the antitrust injury doctrine.
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Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The
injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the
violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the viola-
tion. 7
Thus, in order to apply the antitrust doctrine, one must first
determine the anticompetitive effects of a particular violation, and
then identify the logical consequences of those anticompetitive effects.
If a plaintiffs business or property has been injured and its injury is
due to the anticompetitive effects of an antitrust violation, the plaintiff
has suffered antitrust injury under the Brunswick rule. Injuries that
are not consequences of the anticompetitive effects of antitrust viola-
tions do not constitute antitrust injury and are not compensable under
the remedial provisions of section 4 of the Clayton Act.
A. Albrecht and Antitrust Injury
Clearly, the downstream dealer victim of maximum resale price
fixing does not suffer antitrust injury. In Figure 2, maximum resale
price fixing reduces the price to consumers from P, to P,. Conse-
quently, the downstream firm's profits fall from (P3-P,)Q to zero.
There is no question that the downstream firm has suffered an injury
to its business or property. The downstream firm has suffered simple
injury in fact, not antitrust injury. The injury flows from the procom-
petitive consequences of the price constraint. 1°8 That is, since the
harm flows from a price decrease and the consequent increase in the
quantity sold to consumers from Q to Q, the maximum price fixing
has improved efficiency. 9 The effect and, indeed, the purpose of
maximum price fixing is to prevent distributors from exploiting their
exclusive territories, not to restrain competition."11 As Phillip Areeda
and Donald Turner have noted, "[i]t seems most doubtful that the
purposes of the antitrust laws are served by awarding damages for the
impairment of the plaintiffs monopoly power over newspaper
subscribers." 1 '
Consider the damage claim in Albrecht, where a newspaper dis-
tributor was forced to sell his exclusive newspaper route for less than it
107. Id.
108. Indeed, this is the same price and quantity that competition at the downstream stage
would yield.
109. William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Anti-
trust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 492 & n.96 (1979-80).
110. Frank Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 890 n.20 (1981).
111. PHILLIP AREEDA& DONALD TURNER, 2 ANTITRUST LAW 347 (1978).
[Vol. 24:721
Price Fixing
would have been worth if the publisher had not intervened and caused
him to lose customers. 1 2 Albrecht sued for an amount equal to the
reduced value of his business. 3 But, the size of the reduction in his
newspaper route's value was equal to the capitalized profits that
flowed from the route's exclusivity." 4 The lesson of Brunswick is that
an award based on lost monopoly profits is improper because lost
monopoly profits are not an "injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent."' 1
In their dissenting opinions, Justices Harlan and Stewart exposed
serious flaws in the majority's reasoning." 6 Justice Harlan distin-
guished between maximum price fixing, which prevents price
increases, and minimum resale price maintenance, which limits price
decreases." 7 He noted that newspaper publishers want newspapers
delivered at the lowest possible cost because that yields the lowest
overall price and, thus, the largest circulation."' The imposition of a
maximum price on distributors contributes to this objective.'19 Harlan
explained that price ceilings "do not lessen horizontal competition;
they drive prices toward the level that would be set by intense compe-
tition, and they cannot go below this level unless the [publisher] who
dictates them and the [carrier] who accepts them have both miscalcu-
lated."' 2 °  Further, the price cap prevents carriers from reaping
monopoly or supracompetitive profits.'12  Justice Stewart concurred,
insisting that if the maximum price prevented Albrecht from charging
a higher price than would have existed in a competitive market, the
Herald Company's "actions were fully compatible with the antitrust
laws."' 22
B. The Response to Albrecht
The combination of the obvious procompetitive benefits to con-
sumers of maximum price fixing'23 and the much less compelling
112. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 149.
113. Id.
114. Page, supra note 109, at 491.
115. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
116. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 156-68, 168-70.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 157-58.
120. Id. at 159.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 169. Justice Stewart further noted that "[ftlhe Court today stands the Sherman
Act on its head." Id. at 170.
123. Supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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anticompetitive concerns expressed by the Court, 124 coupled with the
powerful dissents just mentioned, helped lead to a confusion of judi-
cial response to Albrecht's declaration of maximum price fixing's per se
illegality. Much of the confusion revolved around the distinction
between injury in fact and antitrust injury. If maximum price fixing is
good for consumers, how can there be antitrust injury, even if there is
injury in fact? If maximum price fixing is a per se illegal antitrust
violation, however, must not there be some harm to competition
accompanied by some antitrust injury?
In Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., terminated newspaper distrib-
utors complained about their written contracts, which contained a
clause expressly fixing the resale price of a newspaper.12 The district
court, following Albrecht, found that the contract violated the Sherman
Act, but held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the fact or
amount of damages.'26 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and held that the plaintiffs had proved damages in fact.'27 In response,
the district court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to only nom-
inal damages.12
The court found that the dealers were aware that the publisher
was likely to terminate their contracts and change distribution systems
if they raised their prices. Given the dealers' knowledge of the eco-
nomics of the newspaper business, they would not have raised their
prices even if they had been free to do so.'29
The result of lifting the price ceiling would therefore be to
encourage each dealer's fortification and exploitation of his or
her particular monopoly .... This analysis suggests that
although plaintiffs alleged losses may be of the type that the
claimed violation would be likely to cause, they are not of the
type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. 3 '
Similarly, in Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, while noting
maximum vertical price-fixing arguably benefits consumers, the
intended beneficiaries of the antitrust laws,''. the court held that an
express maximum price-fixing clause between the publisher and the
distributors was per se illegal. The court nevertheless determined that
124. Supra notes 37 -41 and accompanying text.
125. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346, 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
126. Id. at 1376, 1388.
127. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 433 U.S.
910 (1977).
128. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 226, 240 (1979).
129. Id. at 239.
130. Id. at 232 n.7.
131. Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 24:721
Price Fixing
the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages because they would not
have raised their prices, even if permitted, because they had the
sophistication to understand that if they had raised prices, they would
have been terminated.
32
The largely futile attempt to reconcile the procompetitive nature
of maximum prices with their per se illegality under Albrecht con-
tinued in Newberry v. Washington Post Co., where the court held that
dealers who had not raised their prices, even when there was a price-
fixing agreement with the publisher, were entitled to only nominal
damages'33 because there was no proof demonstrating when the dealers
would have raised prices, to what level they would have raised prices,
or what the response of subscribers would have been.134
In Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals began a direct attack on Albrecht. Walters, a
building materials dealer, complained that the defendant manufacturer
of prefabricated houses and his dealers conspired to fix maximum
prices to consumers.13 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant.'36 The plaintiff appealed, and the Seventh
Circuit ruled that Walters did not prove the existence of a vertical
price-fixing agreement.'37 The court then struck directly at Albrecht,
stating that whether maximum vertical price fixing was illegal per se
seemed to be "an open question."' 38 The court noted that exclusive
territories were per se illegal at the time Albrecht was decided. Subse-
quently, however, Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. established
that exclusive territories were subject to the rule of reason.'39 Thus,
the Jack Walters court argued that "a manufacturer-imposed price
ceiling intended to limit the power that exclusive territories give
dealers to raise prices ... may also be lawful."'4 °
Even if there was a price fixing arrangement, the Jack Walters
court held that the dealer did not have standing to bring suit because it
had suffered no antitrust injury. 4 Judge Posner found that no evi-
dence had been presented that the lower prices would have been below
cost and therefore predatory and unlawful. Any harm to Walters re-
sulted from competing dealers lowering their prices while Walters did
132. Id. at 476-77.
133. Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 483 (D.D.C. 1977).
134. Id.
135. Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 701.
136. 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,284 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
137. Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 708.
138. Id. at 707.
139, See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
140. Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 706.
141. Id.
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not. Walters could not "complain about having to meet lawful price
competition, which antitrust laws seek to encourage, merely because
the competition may have been enabled by an antitrust violation.
' 142
In Indiana Grocery v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., a different Seventh
Circuit panel ruled, just as it had in Jack Walters, that a dealer alleging
maximum resale price fixing did not suffer antitrust injury and there-
fore did not have standing to make such a claim. 143 The court
explained, "the antitrust laws simply are not in the business of pro-
tecting higher-pricing grocers from lower-pricing competition.,
1 44
The Indiana Grocery court refused to accept that Albrecht required it
to recognize the dealers' standing because Albrecht had been decided
nine years before the Court formulated the antitrust injury require-
ment in Brunswick and did not address the issues of antitrust injury or
antitrust standing.1
45
In none of the above cases did any of the courts expressly reverse
Albrecht. In fact, in several of the cases, the courts purported to follow
it.' 46 Nonetheless, by using sometimes sophisticated damage analysis
and the concept of antitrust injury, these decisions succeeded to a
great extent in immunizing manufacturers who utilized maximum
price fixing from damage liability, and in some cases from private civil
suit.
C. ARCO and Antitrust Injury
In USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (hereinafter
ARCO), USA Petroleum (USA), an independent retail gasoline seller,
alleged that Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) had conspired with
ARCO-brand dealers to sell gasoline at artificially low, uncompetitive
prices in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'47 USA further
alleged that ARCO had attempted to monopolize the local retail gaso-
line market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.'48 USA
complained that ARCO, by conspiring to fix maximum prices with its
142. Id. at 709.
143. Indiana Grocery v. Super Valu Stores, Inc. 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989).
144. Id. at 1419-20.
145. Id. at 1420.
146. Blair & Lang, supra note 89, at 1025.
147. See USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F. Supp. 1296, 1299-1300
(C.D. Cal. 1983).
148. See id. at 1300. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Section 2 states in part: "Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
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dealers, had taken sales from USA and other independents, driving
independent sellers from the market.149
The district court dismissed the section 2 claim and later granted
summary judgment on the maximum price-fixing claim, ruling that
even if the plaintiff could prove a maximum price-fixing conspiracy, it
could not satisfy the antitrust injury requirement without showing
those prices to be predatory.' The court held that no such showing
of predatory pricing was possible because of ARCO's low share (never
exceeding seventeen percent) of the retail gasoline market; even if the
market were narrowed to include only discount sellers, the existence of
several potential entrants prevented ARCO from being able to exer-
cise market power.' When USA appealed the grant of summary
judgment,"2 the Ninth Circuit panel framed the issue as "whether in
the absence of proof of predatory pricing a competitor can recover
damages because of a maximum resale price maintenance agree-
ment.' ' 153 A divided court held that USA could recover on such a
theory and reversed, believing that the inquiry was "straight-
forward."' 54
The "antitrust injury" standard requires us to determine whe-
ther the plaintiffs injuries resulted from a disruption of compe-
tition in the plaintiffs market caused by the defendant's
antitrust violation .... In the present case the inquiry seems
straightforward: USA's claimed injuries were the direct result,
and, indeed, under the allegations we accept as true, the
intended objective, of ARCO's price-fixing scheme. According
to USA, the purpose of ARCO's price-fixing is to disrupt the
market of retail gasoline sales, and that disruption is the source
of USA's injuries.'
The court found that USA's alleged financial losses and its
forced exit from the market because of ARCO's illegal price fixing
were the types of injuries that the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent.15
6
149. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1989).
150. USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F. Supp. at 1307.
151. Id. at 1304. The Supreme Court held in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd, v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), that a predatory pricing claim will not be sustained
when predation is not economically plausible.
152. USA did not appeal the district court's finding that the fixed prices were not
predatory.
153. USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687, 689 (9th Cir. 1988).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 693.
156. Id. at696.
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The Supreme Court granted ARCO's petition for certiorari.157
Since neither ARCO nor the federal enforcement agencies had peti-
tioned the Court to overrule Albrecht, the question before the Court
was "whether a firm incurs an 'injury' within the meaning of the
antitrust laws when it loses sales to a competitor charging nonpreda-
tory prices pursuant to a vertical maximum price-fixing scheme.'
58
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, holding that a firm
does not suffer antitrust injury from a vertical maximum price-fixing
scheme involving its competitor.
1 59
The Court repeated its holding from Brunswick that a private
plaintiff must prove the existence of "antitrust injury, which is to say
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes the defendants' acts unlawful. '160 The
Court also assumed, arguendo, that Albrecht correctly held maximum
vertical price fixing to be per se illegal.161 The Court declared that
Albrecht's maximum price-fixing scheme was per se illegal "because it
threatened to inhibit vigorous competition by the dealers bound by it
and because it threatened to become a minimum price-fixing
scheme. 1 62  After restating the four reasons given in Albrecht for
applying the per se rule to vertical maximum price fixing, 163 the Court
distinguished ARCO from Albrecht.
1 64
The maximum price fixing in Albrecht was illegal per se "because
of its potential effects on dealers and consumers, not because of its
effects on competitors.,1 65 In ARCO, USA had not suffered any of the
injuries mentioned in Albrecht. If the prices set by ARCO were
indeed too low for dealers to furnish the services desired by consum-
ers, competitors would have been benefited, not harmed. Similarly, if
such prices had resulted in the channeling of business to large distrib-
utors, this would have helped competing firms. If the maximum
prices had acquired the attributes of a minimum price-fixing scheme,
USA would have benefited from the higher prices charged by its com-
petitors. In fact, USA's complaint that ARCO's scheme permitted its
dealers to increase their sales was evidence that the concerns of the
Albrecht Court had not been realized. The Court concluded that USA
had not suffered an antitrust injury because "its losses [did] not flow
157. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 490 U.S. 1097 (1989).
158. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. at 331.
159. Id. at 346.
160. Id. at 349 (citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489).
161. Id. at 357 n.16.
162. Id. at 335.
163. Supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.




from the aspects of vertical, maximum price-fixing that render it
illegal." '166 The Court further discussed that
[w]hen a firm, or even a group of firms adhering to a vertical
agreement, lowers prices but maintains them above predatory
levels, the business loss by rivals can not be viewed as an "anti-
competitive" consequence of the claimed violation. A firm com-
plaining about the harm it suffers from non-predatory price
competition "is really claiming that it [is] unable to raise prices."
(citation omitted) This is not antitrust injury; indeed "cutting
prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of
competition."
Although a vertical, maximum price-fixing agreement is unlaw-
ful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it does not cause a
competitor antitrust injury unless it results in predatory pricing.
Antitrust injury does not arise. . . until a private party is
adversely affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's
conduct .... Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how
those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory
levels, they do not threaten competition. Hence, they can not
give rise to antitrust injury.167
The Court dismissed USA's claim that antitrust injury need not
be shown when a per se violation is involved.168 The Court held that
there may be "some procompetitive effects" '169 that result from per se
violations. "The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plaintiff
can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect
or effect of the defendant's behavior. 170
Examining the merits of Albrecht, the Court agreed with the
Albrecht dissenters that maximum vertical price fixing can protect con-
sumers from the price-increasing monopoly power that derives from a
distributor's exclusive territory:
If an exclusive dealership is the most efficient means of distribu-
tion, the public is not served by forcing the manufacturer to
abandon this method and resort to self-distribution or compet-
ing distributors. Vertical, maximum price-fixing thus may have
166. Id. at 337.
167. Id. at 337, 339 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort & Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116
(1986)).
168. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. at 341.
169. Id. at 342.
170. Id.
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procompetitive interbrand effects even if it is per se illegal
because of its potential effects on dealers and consumers. 171
While critics of Albrecht could take heart from this recognition of
the procompetitive effects of maximum vertical price fixing, Albrecht
supporters could find some reason for solace. The Albrecht Court
stated that providing a cause of action for competing dealers was
unnecessary 172 because a manufacturer's own dealers and consumers
might sue "if such a scheme causes the anticompetitive consequences
detailed in Albrecht."
173
While the Court in ARCO did not overrule Albrecht, what it did
do, much like the Seventh Circuit in Jack Walters, was limit Albrecht's
force by denying standing to one group, competing dealers, and
undermine Albrecht's rationale by recognizing the procompetitive
aspects of maximum vertical price fixing.174 It effectively barred com-
peting dealers from bringing suit, while permitting other dealers or
consumers to bring an action if they could prove, in addition to the
violation, that they were injured by the anticompetitive aspects of the
illegal agreement.
However, even after ARCO, the problem of interpreting "anti-
trust injury" still remained. The Court variously defined such injury
as being "adversely affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the defend-
ant's conduct; 1' 76 as losses that stem from an "anticompetitive aspect of
the defendant's conduct"; 177 and as a "competition-reducing aspect or
effect of the defendant's behavior."
178
The notion that consumers or noncompeting dealers could suffer
antitrust injury is troubling. If, as the Court stated, competing dealers
do not suffer antitrust injury because "[f]ow prices benefit consumers
regardless of how [they] are set,' 1 79 how could those same low prices
cause antitrust injury when the complaining party is now either the
dealer through whom the price-fixing agreement was enforced or a
171. Id. at 344 n.13. The majority in Albrecht assumed that exclusive territorial agreements
were unlawful. Justice Douglas, concurring, and Justice Harlan, dissenting, argued that such
agreements were subject to the rule of reason. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154,
157 (1968).
172. The government made this argument with respect to price-fixing dealers in its amicus
brief. Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 21 n.15, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petro-
leum Co., 495 U.S. at 328 (1990) (No. 88-1668).
173. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. at 346.
174. Id. at 342.
175. Id. at346.
176. Id. at 339.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 342.
179. Id. at 339.
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consumer who benefited from the lower prices and has no injury in
fact?18°
What remained after ARCO? Dealers and consumers were free
to sue, but what kind of injury could they suffer from the lower prices
that resulted from maximum price fixing? The antitrust injury doc-
trine intended to prevent mistaken antitrust rules from causing harm-
ful effects by limiting the award of damages to those who suffered
from a practice that caused an anticompetitive or inefficient effect.
After ARCO, what remained was a per se rule that required a finding
of anticompetitive harm from a practice that was thought by most to
be procompetitive.
D. Khan
Barkat Khan leased and operated a Union Oil service station and
convenience store from State Oil Company.18' The terms of the lease
required Khan to buy all of his gasoline from State Oil and limited
him to a margin of 3.25 cents per gallon.8 2 State Oil would suggest a
price to Khan that was 3.25 cents above the price he paid State Oil.
83
Kahn could charge a higher price, but he was required to return the
difference between the retail margin and 3.25 cents per gallon to State
Oil.8 4 He was free to charge a lower price, but unless he could con-
vince State Oil to reduce its wholesale price, his margin would shrink
below 3.25 cents.8 Approximately one year after the lease was
signed, Khan fell behind in his lease payments and State Oil com-
menced proceedings to terminate the agreement. 186 At the request of
State Oil, the court appointed a receiver who operated the station for
about five months.'87 Khan alleged that the receiver was able to obtain
a margin in excess of 3.25 cents by raising his price on premium
grades above the suggested level.'
Khan sued State Oil under section 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging
its contract constituted a per se illegal maximum price-fixing agree-
ment. ' 9 He claimed that without the agreement, he could have
180. See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 317 n.17 (5th Cir. 1978) (observ-
ing in dicta that retail customers would not have standing to challenge a maximum price-fixing
agreement because they would not be injured by it).
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charged a higher price and made higher profits, thereby avoiding
termination.19 The district court granted summary judgment to State
Oil, holding that the per se rule did not apply.19'
The Seventh Circuit reversed on appeal in an opinion by Judge
Posner. 9 2  The court found that the agreement did fix maximum
prices because, even though Khan was free to set a price above the
suggested one, he was forced to remit any amount above the suggested
price, rendering such an action unprofitable.'93 The court held that it
was bound to follow the Supreme Court's per se prohibition of maxi-
mum price fixing, but it struck at the heart of Albrecht, noting that
despite "all its infirmities, its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foun-
dations. . .Albrecht has not been expressly overruled."' 94 Continuing,
the court remarked that "the Supreme Court has told the lower federal
courts, in increasingly emphatic, even strident, terms, not to anticipate
an overruling of a decision by the court; we are to leave the overruling
to the Court itself."'
1 95
But how could a practice be per se illegal if it caused no antitrust
injury? Logic required that the Seventh Circuit's deference to the
Supreme Court's Albrecht rule be accompanied by a finding of anti-
trust injury. How could maximum price fixing be anticompetitive if it
compeled no anticompetitive harm? State Oil reasoned that Brunswick
and its progeny, which required the establishment of antitrust injury,
implicitly overruled Albrecht.' The setting of a maximum price "by a
seller merely prevents his dealers from reaping monopoly profits, the
injury to the dealers from the ceiling-the loss, that is, of monopoly
profits-will not support an antitrust suit."' 97 While expressing its
"considerable sympathy with the argument that Albrecht is inconsist-
ent with the cases that establish the requirement of proving antitrust
injury,"98 the court added, "In fact, we think the argument is
right."' 99 However, the court later reasoned,
State Oil is not able to identify any cases, real or hypothetical, in
which the practice condemned in Albrecht could cause an injury
to the interests of antitrust. If proof of antitrust injury is
required in cases involving the sort of price fixing involved in
190. Id.
191. See Khan, 907 F. Supp. at 1202.
192. See State Oil v. Khan, 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996).
193. See id. at 1360-61.








Albrecht, no such case could be brought, whether by a private
plaintiff or by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
Commission.
More to the point, The Supreme Court's conception of antitrust
injury may be broader than State Oil's.2 °°
The Seventh Circuit went on to point out that "the Court has
never retreated from its proposition that vertical minimum price fixing
(resale price maintenance) is illegal per se. 21 Yet the court remarked,
"Resale price maintenance does not impair any interest that antitrust
laws interpreted in light of modern economics could be thought
intended to protect. 2 2 Obviously tortured, the court went on:
The Court must think that preventing intrabrand price competi-
tion harms an interest protected by the antitrust laws even if the
restriction increases competition viewed as a process for maxi-
mizing consumer welfare and even if a restriction that had simi-
lar effects but was not an explicit regulation of price would be
lawful. If this is what the Court believes-and it does appear to
be the Court's current position, though not one that is easy to
defend in terms of economic theory-the Court may also think
that interfering with the freedom of a dealer to raise prices may
cause antitrust injury .... In Atlantic Richfield, despite the
Court's evident skepticism about the continued soundness of
Albrecht, the Court distinguished it on the ground that the deal-
ers subject to a price ceiling imposed by their supplier, as dis-
tinct from their competitors, were the intended beneficiaries of
Albrecht. See 495 U.S. at 336-37. The implication is that the
injury to a dealer like Khan from not being able to raise his price
because of a restriction imposed by a dealer is antitrust injury.
203
In the subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court alluded to the
Seventh Circuit's attack on Albrecht, noting, "Despite what Chief
Judge Posner aptly described as Albrecht's infirmities, [and] its
increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations, there remains the ques-
tion whether Albrecht deserves continuing respect under the doctrine
of stare decisis."204 The Court said that the Seventh Circuit was correct
in applying that principle even though it disagreed with Albrecht
because "it is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its




204. See Khan, 52 U.S. at 27, 28.
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precedents. '2 ' Having said all that, the Court, in a unanimous
decision written by Justice O'Connor, overruled the Seventh Circuit
and held that maximum vertical price fixing "should be evaluated
under the rule of reason. ,
206
In Khan, the Court reviewed its decisions, beginning with Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 207 and leading up to and
beyond Albrecht,2°s noting the sweeping condemnation of price
restraints in U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum 2°9 and 210 the rejection of an agree-
ment by retailers to fix maximum prices in Kiefer-Stewart.211 Moving
to nonprice vertical restrictions, the Court cited White Motor Co v.
U.S.,212 where "[t]he Court determined that too little was known
about the competitive impact of such vertical limitations to warrant
treating them as per se unlawful. '21 3 It then noted that four years later
in U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,214 the Court had learned enough to
declare maximum vertical price limitations a per se violation.215
The Court noted that Albrecht was decided in the term after
Schwinn, and that the Court had conceded "maximum and minimum
price fixing may have different consequences in many situations. "216
It then observed that Sylvania217 overruled Schwinn in 1977.21 The
Schwinn Court acknowledged the principle of stare decisis, but
explained that the need for clarification of the law justified reconsider-
ation of Schwinn.2
19
The Khan Court then went on to state that its analysis of
"Albrecht's continuing validity ... is also guided by the view that the
primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competi-
tion. ,220 Further, low prices are good for consumers as long as they
are above predatory levels so that a ban on practices that result in
lower prices is "especially costly. '221 With these principles in mind,
205. Id.
206. Id. at 30.
207. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
208. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145.
209. See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
210. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
211. See Khan, 52 U.S. at 12, 13.
212. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
213. See Khan, 52 U.S. at 13.
214. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
215. See Khan, 52 U.S. at 13.
216. Id.
217. See Continental T.V. Inc. v. G.T.E Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
218. See Khan, 52 U.S. at 13.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 15 (citing Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717
(1988)).
221. Id. at 15 (citing Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
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the Court found it difficult to continue to maintain that maximum
vertical price fixing could cause harm to an extent that would justify
its per se illegality.222 The Court went on to address the anticompeti-
tive concerns expressed in Albrecht, concluding that per se condemna-
tion was not justified and that the legality of these price schemes could
be appropriately dealt with under the rule of reason.223
The Court addressed Khan's argument that Albrecht's recon-
sideration "should require 'persuasive expert testimony establishing
that the per se rule has distorted the market,"' noting "it is the reten-
tion of the rule of Albrecht and not, as respondents would have it, the
rule's elimination, that lacks adequate justification.
224
Finally, addressing the question of stare decisis, the Court noted
that it is the "preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles," but it is
not an "inexorable command. ' 225  "There is a competing interest,
well-represented in this Court's decisions, in recognizing and adapting
to changing experiences and the lessons of accumulated experience. ,226
The Court noted that "Albrecht has been widely criticized since its
inception" and that the views underlying the decision were so eroded
that "there is not much of that decision to salvage. ,
227
The Court went on to make clear that it was not holding maxi-
mum vertical price fixing per se legal. Instead, according to the Court,
the practice should be analyzed under the rule of reason, and, in its
view, such analysis effectively identifies those cases involving anti-
competitive conduct.228
At last, it was done. Brunswick had finally worked its will. The
long and tortuous road from Albrecht to Khan was complete. The
antitrust injury doctrine served to force a misguided antitrust rule into
conformity with the goals of antitrust. While some may argue that the
Court should have gone a step further and declared maximum vertical
price fixing per se legal, if future litigation can find no plausible anti-
trust injury, that will soon be the practical result.
574, 594 (1986)).
222. See Khan, 52 U.S. at 15.
223. See id. at 15-16.
224. Id. at 16.
225. Id. at 17 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991)).
226. Khan, 52 U.S. at 17.
227. Id. at 18.
228. See id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Albrecht Court's finding that maximum vertical price fixing
was per se illegal was met by a barrage of criticism from those who felt
(rightly) that the practice was, in fact, procompetitive and welfare
enhancing-a primary goal of antitrust. Further, maximum vertical
price restraints advance every one of the other most frequently sug-
gested goals of antitrust. The Supreme Court held in Brunswick that it
is not enough to show that a violation has occurred and that the viola-
tion has resulted in damage in fact; it held that a plaintiff must also
show that antitrust injury, an injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent, has been suffered. The clear purpose of the
Court's antitrust injury doctrine was to bring substantive antitrust law
into conformity with the goals of antitrust.
Albrecht and Brunswick, together, set in motion an odyssey char-
acterized by futile attempts to reconcile the per se illegality of maxi-
mum price fixing with its increasingly obvious procompetitive effects.
In the end, the tension between Albrecht's misguided per se illegality,
with the accompanying deference to the doctrine of stare decisis on the
one hand, and Brunswick's insistence that the law serve the purposes of
antitrust on the other, was resolved in favor of Brunswick and the goals
of antitrust.
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